What embodied cognition claims — thinking depends on having a body, not just a brain

What the extended mind thesis argues — cognition extends beyond the brain into tools and environment

The extended mind thesis posits that cognitive processes are distributed across the brain, body, and environment

What Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology argues — perception is bodily, not mental representation

Perception is inherently embodied, not merely mental constructs

What functionalism claims about the mind — mental states are defined by their functional roles, not their material

Functionalism posits that mental states are characterized by their causal relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states

How does the Twin Earth thought experiment challenge the internalism versus externalism debate in the philosophy of language and meaning?

Twin Earth suggests externalism, as meanings depend on environmental factors, not just internal cognitive states

What substance dualism claims — mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of stuff

Dualism posits that mind and body are distinct, non-physical and physical substances, respectively

What the binding problem asks — how does the brain integrate separate sensory inputs into unified experience

The binding problem inquires: How does the brain synthesize distinct sensory inputs into a cohesive perception?